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A Threat to Ohio's Referendum:
State ex rel. Rifle v. Brown
The power to repeal state laws by popular referendum' has been
constitutionally guaranteed to the people of Ohio since the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1912. The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in
State ex rel Rifle v. Brown2 however, has seriously threatened that
right. The court held that an election day registration law,3 which in-
cluded several controversial provisions, was exempted from referendum
in its entirety because it included an "appropriation for the current
expenses of the state government" 4 that was not subject to referendum.
This holding was reached despite the fact that the appropriation re-
lated only indirectly to the changes in election procedures on which a
referendum was sought
Brown presents a significant question in Ohio constitutional law:
May legislators circumvent the people's right of referendum on an
unpopular law by including in it an "appropriation for the current ex-
penses of the state government"? The holding in Brown answers this
question in the affirmative. As a result, the right of referendum, guaran-
teed to the people of Ohio by the Ohio Constitution, is now subject to
the control of the state legislature. This Case Comment will consider
the background of the controversy surrounding the Brown decision and
demonstrate that its holding is neither supported by precedent nor
justified as a matter of public policy.
I. OHIO'S REFERENDUM
Traditional representative government functions through elected
representatives who enact laws on behalf of the people. In contrast,
the referendum and its counterpart, the initiative, are means of direct
legislation. Through the initiative procedure, 6 individual citizens may
propose laws and constitutional amendments that are submitted to the
electorate at a general or special election for approval or rejection.
The referendum, on the other hand, is essentially a popular veto.
Within ninety days of the passage by the Ohio General Assembly of a
I. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1.
2. 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 365 N.E.2d 876 (1977).
3. Am. Sub. S. B. No. 125, 1977 Laws of Ohio 5-38 (Baldwin 1977),
4. OHIo CoNsT. art. II, § Id.
5. The appropriation was the biennial budget of the office of the Secretary of State,
6. OHIO CONST. art. II §§ la-lb.
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law that includes an appropriation, interested persons may submit
petitions to the Secretary of State demanding that the law be put to a
vote of the people.7 If a majority of the electors vote to reject the law,
it will not be implemented. In order to avoid undue disruption of state
government, however, the constitution provides for three exceptions to
the referendum: "[1]aws providing for tax levies, appropriations for the
current expenses of the state government and state institutions, and
emergency laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety."8
Ohio's constitutional provisions for initiative and referendum are a
legacy of the Progressive Movement. Progressive delegates to the
Constitutional Convention of 1912 were committed to the implementa-
tion of direct legislation. The initiative and referendum were seen as
means of taking legislative power from a general assembly dominated
by special interests and returning it to the people.9 "Friends of the
reform," a study of the Progressive Movement notes, "argued that the
people of Ohio had lost faith in representative government because of
the corruption and irresponsibility of the legislature and were deter-
mined to have a larger direct share in policy making through the
initiative and referendum."'
II. THE Brown DECISION
A. The Facts
The Brown controversy stemmed from an apparent attempt on the
part of legislative leaders to avoid a referendum on Ohio's election
day voter registration law." Considerable controversy surrounded the
passage of the law because it provided for both election day registra-
7. Id. art. II, § Ic.
8. Id. art. II, § Id.
9. VI C. W-rrKE, THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF O1110 13 (1942).
10. H. WARNER, PROGRESSIVISM IN OHIO 1897-1917 321 (1964). The push for direct
legislation drew national attention during the early part of the century. In a 1911 speech Woodrow
Wilson said:
If we felt that we had genuine representative government in our State legislatures.
no one would propose the initiative and referendum in America. They are being pro-
posed now as a means of bringing our representatives back to the consciousness that
what they are bound in duty and in mere policy to do is to represent the sovereign
people whom they profess to serve, and not the private interests W~hich creep into their
councils by way of machine orders and committee conferences.
Address by Woodrow Wilson in Kansas City (May 5, 1911) reprinted in J. KING, THE STATEWIDE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM S. Doc. No. 736, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1917).
11. Justice Paul Brown, a dissenter in the Brown decision, was among those %%ho believed
that the leaders of the Ohio General Assembly had acted deliberately to avoid a referendum
on election day registration. He charged that their action was a "legislative ploy designed by
a present majority of the General Assembly to circumvent the peoples power of referendum."
State ex reL Rifle v. Brown, 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 168, 365 N.E.2d 876, 887 (1977) (Brown, J.
dissenting).
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tion12 and permanent voter registration.1 3 The law was enacted despite
strenuous objection from the Secretary of State, 4 the state's chief
election official, and over Governor Rhodes' line-item veto of significant
portions.15  Proponents of the law argued that it would significantly
increase voter participation in Ohio elections.' 6  Opponents insisted
that it would lead to election fraud.'
7
As passed, the election reform law contained five sections. Four
dealt in considerable detail with provisions for registering and voting
in Ohio elections. 8 The fifth was a current appropriation for the
expenses of the office of the Secretary of State. Opponents of the law
charged that the appropriation was added as an amendment for the
sole purpose of avoiding a referendum on election day registration.19
When the law was filed with his office, Secretary of State Ted W.
Brown set two different effective dates for it.2°  Section five, the
appropriation section, became effective May 27, 1977, the date the
Governor signed it, because it was excepted from referendum as an
"appropriation for the current expenses of the state government"2'
and hence was not subject to the ninety-day delay incident to the
referendum. All other sections were to become effective August 30,
1977, ninety days after filing, because Secretary of State Brown con-
sidered them to be laws on which popular referenda could be held.
On June 6, 1977, Ohioans for the Preservation of Honest Elec-
tions, a group opposed to election day registration, filed a petition for
referendum on the election day registration law with the Ohio Attorney
General. Shortly thereafter, Vernal G. Riffe, Jr., Speaker of the Ohio
House of Representatives, and Oliver Ocasek, President Pro Tempore
of the Ohio Senate, filed a complaint in the Ohio Supreme Court
against Secretary of State Brown. Their complaint prayed that" 'writs
12. Am. Sub. S. B. No. 125, 1977 Laws of Ohio 5-38 (Baldwin 1977). Section 3503.11 of
the law provided for registration of qualified voters with proper idcntification at polling places
on the day of an election.
13. Id. The election day registration law repealed all but the last paragraph of the
existing election statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.25 (Page 1975), which required cancella-
tion of registration of any voter who did not vote in any two-year period. As aconsequence
of this repeal, a voter's registration cannot be cancelled for failure to vote.
14. Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 10, 1977, § A at 12, col. I.
15. Columbus Citizen J., May 30, 1977, at I, col. 3.
16. E.g., League of Women Voters of Ohio, Statement on S.1. 125 (Apr. 28. 1977) (pre-
pared for the Ohio House of Representatives Election Committee).
17. E.g., Kurfess (Ohio House Minority Leader), Legislator Feels Honest Electlionv Need
Protecting, Columbus Dispatch, Sept. 23, 1977, § B at 3, col. 1.
18. The law provides for amendment of thirty-five sections of the Ohio Revised Code,
enactment of one new section and repeal of five sections. Among the reforms are a requirement
for registration in all counties, registration by mail, registration by motor vehicle registrars,
minimum hours for board of elections for registration and the establishment of a master list
of registered voters, as well as election day and permanent registration.
19. See Columbus Citizen J., June 17, 1977, at 22, col. 1.
20. State ex rel. Rifle v. Brown, 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 150, 365 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1977).
21. OHIo CONsT. art. II, § Id.
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of mandamus and prohibition issue directing respondent [Secretary
of State Brown] to advise all county boards of elections to give im-
mediate effect to the election procedures mandated by Amended Sub-
stitute Senate Bill No. 125 [election day registration law] and pro-
hibiting respondent from taking any further action to frustrate or deny
implementation of such legislation.' ,22
B. The Court's Conclusion
In Brown the Ohio Supreme Court was called on to reconcile
conflicting language in the referendum provisions of Ohio's Consti-
tution. Article II, section 1 of the constitution grants to the people the
power to reject "any law, section of any law or any item in any law
appropriating money." Section lc, which outlines the referendum
procedure, similarly refers to "any law, section of any law or any item
in any law":
lc. Initiative and referendum (Cont.)
The second aforestated power [set forth in section 1] reserved by the
people is designated the referendum, and the signatures of six per centum
of the electors shall be required upon a petition to order the submission to
the electors of the state for their approval or rejection, of an, law, section
of any law or any item in any law appropriating money passed by the
general assembly. No law passed by the general assembly shall go into
effect until ninety days after it shall have been filed by the governor in
the office of the secretary of state, except as herein provided.
In contrast to sections 1 and lc, section ld that provides for
exceptions to the right of referendum refers only to "laws" and makes
no mention of sections or items within laws:
ld. Emergency laws; not subject to referendum.
Laws providing for tax levies, appropriations for the current ex-
penses of the state government and state institutions, and emergency laws
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety, shall go into immediate effect. . . The laws mentioned in this
section shall not be subject to the referendum.24
Hence, the Brown court was presented with a question of constitutional
interpretation: Does section ld except from referendum laws only in
their entirety, or does it also except sections and items of laws sepa-
rately? That is, if a law contains several sections, one or more of which
come within the exceptions named in section Id (tax levies, appropria-
tions for current state expenses and emergency laws) and one or more
that do not come within the section Id exceptions, is the entire law
excepted from referendum or only that section of the law that comes
within the section 1d exceptions?
22. State ex reL Rifle v. Brown, 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 149, 365 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1977).
23. OHIo CONsT. art. II, § Ic (emphasis added).
24. Id. art. II, § Id (emphasis added).
1978]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Both sides in Brown agreed that the appropriation section in the
election day registration law was an "appropriation for the current
expenses of the state government" within the meaning of section Id
and was therefore excepted from referendum. 25 The court was called
on to decide whether, because no referendum could be had on the
appropriation section, referenda on the other sections of the law were
precluded. After consideration of relevant prior cases, the court con-
cluded that when any section of a law comes within the exceptions
stated in Id, the entire law is excepted from the referendum. Thus,
since a referendum could not be held on the appropriation section of
the election day registration law, the sections providing for election
day and permanent voter registration were also held to be excluded
from referendum.
C. Case Authority
There is little reason to question the precedent relied on by the
majority in Brown. The Ohio authority relating to the constitutional
provision is sparse, but the cases cited are unquestionably relevant to
the issues presented. The use the court made of these cases, however,
is open to criticism. In a heated dissent, Chief Justice O'Neill charged
that "the majority has necessarily overruled, ignored or improperly
distinguished all previous case law. 26 A review of that law supports
the criticism made by the chief justice and reveals that the court
strained to reach a result opposite that supported by the cases it
cited.
1. State ex reL Donahey v. Roose
State ex rel. Donahey v. Roose,2 a decision reached two years
after the introduction of the referendum procedure, was relied on by
the Brown court to support its holding that if one section of the law is
excepted from referendum, all sections are excepted from it. Con-
sideration of the Roose decision, however, shows that the case sug-
gests an opposite result.
In Roose, State Auditor Donahey brought an action for a writ of
mandamus to compel the auditor of Putnam County to place on the
county tax lists and tax duplicate a tax passed by the Ohio General
Assembly on April 8, 1913. John Roose, the County Auditor, refused.
He argued that pursuant to article II, section Ic of the Ohio Constitu-
tion there is a ninety-day delay between the filing of a law with the
Secretary of State and its effective date. "[T]he ninety days," he in-
25. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 152, 365 N.E.2d at 878.
26. Id. at 161-62, 365 N.E.2d at 883 (O'Neill, C.J., dissenting).
27. 90 Ohio St. 345, 107 N.E. 760 (1914).
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sisted, "did not expire until the 13th day of August, 1913.:n There-
fore, "this levy did not attach as a lien upon the real and personal
property of the state of Ohio for the year 1913." 29 It is evident from
the opinion that Roose did not deny that "laws providing for tax levies"
are excepted from referendum by article II, section Id. Rather, his
refusal to place the tax on the duplicate for the year 1913 was based
on his belief that, because other sections of the law were not excepted
from referendum, and were thus subject to a ninety-day delay, the
effective date of the tax levy section of the law was likewise delayed
for ninety days. The issue presented the court was whether, when a
law contains both a section excepted from referendum and sections
otherwise subject to referendum, the entire law is subject to the ninety-
day delay. The court held that the tax levy was immediately effective.
In doing so, however, it suggested that the other sections of the law
might still have been subject to referendum:
While perhaps some of the sections of this act may have been subject
to the referendum provisions of Section Ic of Article II of the Constitu-
tion, yet Section id of Article II expressly exempts laws providing for tax
levies from the operation of the preceding provision of the Constitution.
Therefore section 1 of this act, providing for a tax levy of one-half mill
on all taxable property within the state, went into immediate operation
when approved and signed by the governor. 3
This language, as the Brown majority insisted,31 is probably obiter
dictum. The Roose court held that the question of divisibility of laws
for the purposes of referendum need not be decided because even
though the tax levy did not go into effect until August 13, 1913, it
could attach as a lien for the year 1913.2 Nonetheless, the opinion
is a contemporary interpretation of a constitutional provision and its
assumptions went unchallenged for over sixty years. The language
used indicated that the court believed that, when one section of a law
comes within an exception to referendum provided for by section Id,
the law is divisible for purposes of referendum:
The contention of counsel that an act containing some sections sub-
28. lId at 347, 107 N.E. at 761.
29. Id Roose's argument was based on § 5671 of the General Code, which proided that
tax levies attach on the day preceding the second Monday of April each year. He contended
that the tax levy did not meet that deadline because, although it was passed on April 8, 1913, it
did not become effective until August 13, 1913. Id. at 351, 107 N.E. at 762.
30. Id. at 349, 107 N.E. at 761.
31. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 154, 365 N.E.2d at 879.
32.
while Section 5671, General Code, fixes the date in each year that the lien of the state
for taxes shall attach, yet it by no means follows that this requires that the tax levy
shall be made on or before that date. . . . [It is clear that the amount of taxes is to be
determined subsequently, and the assessment then relates back to the date at which the
taxes became a lien.
90 Ohio St- at 351-52, 107 N.E. at 762.
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ject to the referendum will take effect only as a whole after the expira-
tion of ninety days from the date it is filed in the office of the secretary of
state, is not sustained by the provisions of Section lc of Article II of the
Constitution. That section of the constitution expressly authorizes a
referendum upon any section of a law or any item of a law appropriating
money. It follows that such sections of a law as are not subject to the
referendum will go into immediate effect notwithstending other sections
or other items may be subject to the delay incident to a referendum or
the right to petition therefore.
33
Despite having dismissed this language in the Roose opinion, the
Brown court relied on a restatement of it in the Roose syllabus, which
states:
Section Ic of Article II of the Constitution of Ohio expressly provides
for a referendum not only upon any law but any section of a law. All
sections of a law not subject to the referendum provisions of this section
of the constitution go into immediate effect when approved and signed by
the governor.34
Considered alone, the second sentence of this section of the syllabus
is ambiguous. The phrase "not subject to the referendum" can have
as its antecedent either "law" or "sections." The Brown court con-
cluded that the phrase modified "law" and, therefore read the sentence
as though it said "all sections of a law [that is] not subject to the refer-
endum . . . go into immediate effect." Therefore, the court held:
In our view, a law which is "not subject to the referendum provi-
sions" of section Ic is a law of the nature set forth in Section Id. One
such law so mentioned is a law providing for "*** appropriations for the
current expenses of the state government ***." Accordingly, pursuant
to the foregoing paragraph of the Roose syllabus, "[a]ll [meaning, each
and every] sections of a law not subject to the referendum provisions of
*** section [lc] of the constitution go into immediate effect when approved
and signed by the governor."
As to other laws, which are not laws mentioned in Section Id, but that
may similarly be laws "appropriating money," such laws do not go into
effect for 90 days and the referendum process of Section le is available.
The sections and items of any laws thus subject to referendum are like-
wise, but severally or collectively, subject to referendum according to the
express provisions of Section Ic. Inasmuch as a law mentioned in
Section Id, by the terms of that constitutional provision, is clearly ineligi-
ble for referendum, the sections, items or other parts of such law must
necessarily share that constitutionally imposed disability.35
This reliance on the syllabus is not unreasonable in itself. In
Ohio the syllabus, rather than the body of an opinion, is the law of the
case.36  The Brown majority, however, overlooked the fact that the
33. Id. at 349, 107 N.E. at 761.
34. Id. at 345, 107 N.E. at 760 (syllabus 2) (emphasis added).
35. 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 154, 365 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (1977).
36. Sup. CT. R. PRAC. VI. (Ohio), construed in State ex rel Donahey v. Edmonson, 89
[Vol. 39:158
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syllabus is to be read in light of the facts of the case.37 When read in
that light, it is clear that the Roose syllabus was misread by the Brown
court. To be consistent with the language of the opinion, the state-
ment in the syllabus that "[a]ll sections of a law not subject to the
referendum . ..go into immediate effect" must be read as though it
said "all sections of a law [that are] not subject to the referendum ...
go into immediate effect." As noted earlier, the wording used in the
Roose opinion was "such sections of a law as are not subject to refer-
endum will go into immediate effect notwithstanding other sections or
other items may be subject to the delay incident to a referendum or
the right to petition therefore., 38  Thus, the Brown court's interpreta-
tion of the Roose syllabus reaches a result opposite to that which the
earlier court intended; that is, that sections of a law other than those
excepted from referendum do not go into immediate effect and are
subject to referendum.
It is worth noting that prior to Brown, commentators cited Roose
for the proposition that laws are divisible for the purpose of referendum
when they include a section excepted from referendum. Ohio's At-
torney General Thomas J. Herbert was asked in 1943 for an opinion on
the divisibility of a particular law for purposes of referendum. Citing
Roose, he concluded that, while one section of the law in question came
within the exceptions in section Id and was therefore effective im-
mediately, the other sections did not come within the exception pro-
vision and did not "become effective until after the expiration of the
ninety day period permitted by the Constitution within which to subject
such law to referendum. 39  Likewise, in a discussion of the initiative
and referendum in another source, Roose was cited for the same propo-
sition.40
2. State ex rel. Davies Manufacturing Co. v. Donahey
State ex reL Davies Manufacturing Co. v. Donahe 41 was also
relied on by the Brown majority. Donahey dealt with a law ap-
propriating funds for the purchase of license plates by the state. As
passed, the law provided for current appropriations and was therefore
Ohio St. 93, 105 N.E. 269 (1913). See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 44142
(1952).
37. Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124, 190 N.E. 403 (1934).
38. 90 Ohio St. at 349, 107 N.E. at 761 (emphasis added).
39. 1943 Op. A-r'Y GEN. 6207 (Ohio 1943).
40. Annot., 146 A.L.R. 284, 288 (1943):
A section of a statute which provides for a tax levy on all taxable property within
the state, being, under express provisions of the Ohio Constitution, excepted from the
referendum provision, goes into immediate operation when approved and signed by the
governor, although other sections of the same act which are subject to referendum do not
go into operation until the expiration of ninety days from the date it is filed in the office
of the secretary of the state. It was so held in State ex rel. Donahey v. Roose ....
41. 94 Ohio St. 382, 114 N.E. 1037 (1916).
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excepted from referendum. It was filed with the Secretary of State
June 5th and considered to be effective as of that date. Included in
the law, however, was a section requiring competitive bidding on all
contracts funded by the appropriation. In a challenge to the effective
date of the law, Davies Manufacturing Company argued that the
competitive bidding provision in the law was subject to referendum
and therefore not effective until ninety days after the law was filed.
The challenge arose because of a contract dispute between Davies
Manufacturing Company and the state. On August 15th, Davies sub-
mitted a proposal to supply license plates to the state at nineteen and
one quarter cents a pair. Upon acceptance of the proposal by the
Secretary of the State, the company sublet the contract to another firm
at fifteen cents a pair. State Auditor Donahey refused to pay for the
tags at the higher rate. Instead, he issued a voucher in the amount of
the subcontract price. He insisted that the state was not bound to pay
the higher price because of the absence of competitive bidding on
the contract. The court rejected Davies' argument that the require-
ment of competitive bidding in the law was subject to referendum and
therefore did not take effect until after its proposal had been accepted.
It held that all sections of the law became effective immediately be-
cause the law came within the exception to referendum for current
appropriations. The opinion makes clear, however, that the court did
not see the requirement of competitive bidding as a distinct section
within the law, but rather as an integral and inseparable part of it.
42
The Donahey court stated: "[t]he appropriation in question was an
appropriation for the current expenses of the state government, and
the limitation with reference to competitive bidding was simply a
condition under which an appropriation should be drawn. 43
The Brown court characterized the holding of Donahey as fol-
lows: "[T]he appropriation Act, including the required competitive
bidding provision, went into immediate effect and was not subject to a
referendum under Section lc, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.
44
Thus, according to the majority in Brown, Donahey stands for the
principle that a law that includes any provision excepted from the
referendum goes into immediate effect and no section of it is subject
to referendum.
Chief Justice O'Neill, in his dissenting opinion in Brown, objected
strongly to the majority's reading of Donahey. He pointed out that
in Donahey the provision in dispute "consisted of 12 words buried in a
42. See Fordham and Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 Oilo STATU L.J.
495, 526 (1950), in which Donahey was said to hold that "[w]hile a capital outlay item in a
general appropriation bill would be subject to referendum the court considered a condition
attached to a current expense item a part, in effect, of that item."
43. 94 Ohio St. at 385, 114 N.E. at 1038.
44. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 155, 365 N.E.2d at 880.
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168-page general appropriations Act."45 The Donahey court, he said,
"there concluded that a provision in an appropriation Act concerning
competitive bidding was not a separable portion of the Act subject to
referendum but that it was a 'condition under which the appropria-
tion could be drawn.' ,46
Only in a footnote did the Brown majority acknowledge that the
Donahey court focused on the fact that the competitive bidding re-
quirement was a condition on the appropriations made in the law.47
Efforts to distinguish Brown and Donahey were rejected by the Brown
majority:
Respondent argues that the conditional influence of the competitive
bidding provisions upon the law under review [in Donahev] required a
decision that the provision was not subject to referendum. Whether such
a fine distinction was intended to be set forth for the purposes of that case
or for all time we need not here decide. In the cause sub judice, we find
that section 5 of the law, conceded to be not subject to referendum, is
clearly a condition upon the remaining sections of the law.4s
Review of the history of the election day registration law's passage
suggests that section five was not perceived by the drafters as a con-
dition on the other sections. As noted earlier, the first four sections of
the law make extensive changes in the state's election laws. Section
five includes the appropriation of the entire biennial operating budget
of the office of the Secretary of State. Obviously, election laws could not
be implemented if the Secretary of State's office was not funded. This
fact, does not, however, justify the conclusion that the budget provi-
sions are a condition on the election reform provisions. As originally
passed by the Ohio Senate, the law did not contain section five. It
was added by the Senate after the bill was returned following passage
by the House of Representatives. This action has led to repeated
charges that the appropriation was added as an amendment solely
for the purpose of avoiding a referendum on the issue of election day
registration.49 Moreover, as Chief Justice O'Neill pointed out in his
dissent, the competitive bidding provision in Donahey was integrated
into the law, whereas in Brown, the sections of the law were quite
distinct and separable. Of this the chief justice said:
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Act in question here are totally unrelated
to the appropriation of funds or procedures for their expenditure. Re-
lators [and the majority] would have a 40 page Act of the General As-
sembly, amending numerous election laws, shielded from referendum
45. Id. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 885 (O'Neill, CJ., dissenting).
46. L. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 885-86 (O'Neill, CJ., dissenting).
47. Il at 155 n.2, 365 N.E.2d at 880 n.2.
48. ld
49. E.g., Leutz, Ohioans Lose Right to Referendum, Capital Law Forum (Capital Uni-
versity), November 1977, at 5.
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because a part of Section 5 of the Act appropriates money for current
expenses.5
0
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that neither Roose nor
Donahey supports the majority's conclusion in Brown. Roose sug-
gests an opposite holding and the facts in Donahey are clearly dis-
tinguishable from those in Brown. Faced with a situation in which
there was no binding precedent, the Brown court might reasonably
have relied on the intent of the framers of the consitutional provision
or policy considerations, to justify its holding. Instead, the court
slighted them and chose to rely on doubtful precedent.
III. THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
The intent of the framers of the referendum provisions of the Ohio
Constitution was dealt with by the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown only
in a footnote.5" In the footnote, the Brown majority responded to the
argument raised by respondent that when some sections of a law do
not come within the exceptions provided for by section Id, those sec-
tions should not go into immediate effect and should be subject to
referendum. To bring about this result, the court said, it would be
necessary to redraft section Id. Instead of reading as it does-"[l]aws
providing for tax levies, appropriations for the current expenses of
the state -government and state institutions, and emergency laws .. .
shall go into immediate effect" 52 -section ld would have to say " 'sec-
tions of laws mentioned in this section shall not be subject to the
referendum.' "" To so redraft the section, the majority asserted, "is
outside the competence of this court." 54  The Brown majority rea-
soned:
When the framers desired the Constitution to apply to sections of laws,
as in Section Ic, they expressed that desire in plain language. Sections
Ic and Id were drafted and adopted at the same time, and we must as-
sume that the framers intended the terms "laws" and "sections of laws"
to have consistent meanings in both. It logically follows that since a law
containing a section appropriating funds for current expenses of state
government is a law mentioned in Section Id, it is not a law subject to
the referendum.
55
A very literal reading of the Ohio Constitution might support the
court's position. As Chief Justice O'Neill pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, however, it is possible to distort meaning by being overly
50. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 166, 365 N.E. 2d at 886 (O'Neill, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 154 n.1, 365 N.E.2d at 880 n.l.
52. OHIO CONST. art. II, § Id.
53. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 154 n.1, 365 N.E.2d at 880 n.l.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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literal.56  In support of this view, the chief justice quoted the words of
Judge Learned Hand:
There is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language
-be it a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract-than to read the words
literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is meant to
secure. Nor is a court ever less likely to do its duty than when, with an
obsequious show of submission, it disregards the overriding purpose be-
cause the particular occasion which has arisen, was not foreseen.5
Judge Learned Hand's thought seems particularly appropriate in
this case. The Brown court determined the intent of the framers
without alluding to the attitudes of the Progressives who wrote the
words. Earlier opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, however, had
given great weight to those attitudes when considering the meaning of
the referendum provisions. In State ex rel. Keller v. Forney," for
example, the 'court pointed out that "great precaution [was] taken by
the constitutional convention of 1912 to set forth and safeguard, with
the particularity of detail usually found only in legislative acts, the
right of referendum, and the three exceptions thereto . . . ." There-
fore, the court said, "our court should not deny the people that right
[referendum] unless the act in question is plainly and persuasively
included within one of the three classes excepted from the operation
of the referendum. ' 60 The rule to be followed in interpreting the
referendum provisions, according to the Forney court, is to give excep-
tions to the right of referendum "strict, but reasonable construction."
In Forney the court acknowledged that the framers of the Ohio
Constitution did not intend that the exception provisions could be used
by the legislature to circumvent the constitutional guarantee of the
right of referendum. Exceptions had been confined by the framers to
only those essential to the efficient operation of government. Pro-
gressives who fought for direct legislation intended the referendum as
a means of returning power to the electorate. They were suspicious
of the legislature and intended that the referendum be used to over-
turn legislation passed in favor of special interests.
A further indication of the intent of the framers to safeguard,
rather than limit, the right of referendum is to be seen in the wording
of article II, section lg of the Ohio Constitution. After setting out in
56. Id. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 886 (O'Neill, CJ., dissenting).
57. Id. (O'Neill, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r,
159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
58. 108 Ohio St. 463, 141 N.E. 16 (1923). In Forney. the court was presented with the
question whether the Taft Act, Act of April 30, 1923, 110 Ohio Laws 464 (1923). "[a]n act to
revise and codify the laws relating to the levy of taxes," was excepted from the referendum as a
"law 'providing for tax levies'" under article II, section Id.
59. Id. at 467, 141 N.E. at 17.
60. Id. at 467-68.
61. Id. at 463, 141 N.E. at 16 (syllabus 1).
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detail the mechanics of the referendum procedure, it concludes: "[t]he
foregoing provisions of this section shall be self-executing, except as
herein otherwise provided. Laws may be passed to facilitate their
operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either such provisions
or the power herein reserved. 62  This language is intended, the Ohio
Supreme Court said in Shryock v. Zanesville,63 to make it impossible
for the legislature to "cripple or destroy" the right of referendum."
Preservation of the right of referendum was obviously of great
importance to the framers of the referendum provisions and to the
courts that interpreted those provisions in the years following their
adoption. The Brown court ignored these attitudes and focused in-
stead on the exact wording of the provisions. As a consequence of
this literal reading of the constitution, a holding was reached that
puts no limits on the power of the legislature to include excepted pro-
visions in laws otherwise subject to referendum. It will allow the
exception provisions of the referendum section of the Ohio Constitu-
tion to take precedence over the granting provisions, a result clearly
contrary to what the framers intended. The result may be that the
right of referendum will be overcome by the ability of the legislature
to bring most laws within the exceptions to that right by adding a
section that includes "an appropriation for the current expenses of
state government."
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the fact that it was dealing with a potential limitation on a
constitutionally guaranteed right, the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown
failed to discuss the policy considerations that should have been con-
sidered in interpreting the constitution. The court gave the constitu-
tion the narrowest possible reading and distorted prior cases in order
to support that reading, while ignoring the policy considerations that
favored an opposite result. The Brown decision not only overlooks
the importance of proceeding cautiously in construing the constitution,
but also removes an important check on the ability of the legislature
to enact laws favoring special interests.
Chief Justice O'Neill, in his dissenting opinion, charged that
"[t]he people's constitutional right of referendum is one of the bedrocks
of democracy, yet the approach of the majority appears to manifest
more concern for its circumvention that [sic] for its preservation. 6 "
This charge finds substance in the failure of the Brown majority to
consider the intent of the framers of the referendum provisions before
62. OHIO CONST. art. II, § Ig.
63. 92 Ohio St. 375, 110 N.E. 937 (1915).
64. Id. at 382,110 N.E. at 939.
65. 51 Ohio St. 2d at 158, 365 N.E.2d at 881 (O'Neill, C.J., disenting).
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giving those provisions an eviscerating interpretation. Justice Brown,
who wrote a separate dissent, saw this laxness in constitutional in-
terpretation as a threat not only to the right of referendum, but to the
constitution itself:
From today forward, the people's constitutional right to referendum has
been abolished, or at the very least, diminished to a mere privilege to be
granted by the General Assembly in only those instances where a rcfer-
endum would not pose a serious threat to the legislation. The approval
of this scheme by a majority of this court marks the beginning of the
demise of constitutional government in Ohio."
Justice Brown's warning, though perhaps overstated, is echoed
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Herbert, who saw the decision as
the end of the referendum and the loss of an important part of the
state's system of checks and balances. "By its decision today," he
said, "the majority has all but swept away the ultimate check upon
one of those branches of the government: the people's constitutional
right to legitimately strike down legislation with which they might
strongly disagree."67 Justice Herbert's assessment of the importance
of the referendum parallels that of a much earlier opinion of the Ohio
Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening,6' a 1915 de-
cision, Judge Wanamaker saw the deterrent power of the referendum
as its greatest significance:
The potential virtue of the "I. & R." [initiative and referendum] does not
reside in the good statutes and good constitutional amendments initiated,
nor in the bad statutes and bad proposed constitutional amendments that
are killed. Rather, the greatest efficiency of the "I. & R." rests in the
wholesome restraint imposed automatically upon the general assembly
and the governor and the possibilities of that latent power when called
into action by the voters.69
Hoyt Langdon Warner, in his study of Progressivism in Ohio,
confirmed the reasoning of Judge Wanamaker. "The referendum,"
he said, "has been employed to defeat objectionable laws and has no
doubt acted as a brake on unscrupulous attempts at legislation by
special interests." 70  In a similar vein, Carl Wittke's history of Ohio
considers the referendum at length and concludes:
The adoption of the initiative and referendum placed legislative
power more directly in the hands of the voters. While a number of
specific constitutional limitations were imposed on its exercise, the net
result was a great potential increase in popular control of government.
Subsequent events were to demonstrate that it was not to be used as
widely as many of its proponents hoped, or its opponents feared. Never-
66. Id. at 168-69, 365 N.E.2d at 887 (Brown, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 168, 365 N.E.2d at 887 (Herbert, J., dissenting).
68. 93 Ohio St. 264, 112 N.E. 1029 (1915).
69. Id. at 277-78, 112 N.E. at 1032.
70. H. WARNER, supra note 10, at 486.
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theless, it created an instrument which the people could use to exercise
direct control over their government.7'
By limiting the right of referendum, the Brown decision has re-
moved the restraint on the legislature that that right imposed. This
consideration should certainly have weighed against the holding the
court reached. In deciding Brown, the court was determining not only
whether a referendum could be had on the issue of election day regis-
tration,72 but also whether the legislature was to be empowered to
circumvent the people's right of referendum in the future. Un-
fortunately, the court chose to be swayed by doubtful precedent rather
than important policy considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the Brown decision has severely
limited the right of Ohio voters to demand popular referenda on legis-
lative acts. At least theoretically, this situation could be overcome by
amending the Ohio Constitution to strengthen the right of referendum.
This possibility seems unlikely for the present, however, because there
does not appear to be any public awareness of the significance of the
Brown decision. Until there is such an awareness and a movement
for reform, it is evident that whenever the general assembly wishes
to avoid a referendum, it can do so by adding a current appropria-
tion to any act likely to be challenged. This result was neither man-
dated by the law nor justified as a matter of public policy."3
There has not been sufficient time to determine what the eventual
result of the Brown decision will be. Whether legislators will take
advantage of the decision is yet to be seen. Nonetheless, it is obvious
that the control over the legislature which the referendum provided
and for which the Progressives fought, has been severely eroded by
the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Brown.
71. 6 C. WITrrKE, supra note 9, at 13.
72. Opponents of election day voter registration, precluded from demanding a referendum,
used the initiative provisions of article II, § la of the Ohio Constitution to propose a constitu-
tional amendment providing for voter registration at least thirty days prior to an election. The
initiative procedure requires signatures of ten per cent of the electorate while the referendum
procedure requires signatures of only six per cent. Nonetheless, the petition drive succeeded
and the amendment was placed on the ballot in the November l, 1977 general election. It
passed by a substantial majority. Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 9, 1977. § A at I. col. 1.
73. See State ex reL Rifle v. Brown, 51 Ohio St. 2d 149, 158, 365 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1977)
(O'Neill, C.J., dissenting).
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